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Going Outside the Model
Robustness Analysis and Experimental Science∗
Michael Bycroft†
In 1966 the population biologist Richard Levins gave a forceful
and influential defence of a method called “robustness analysis”
(RA). RA is a way of assessing the result of a model by showing
that different but related models give the same result. As Levins
put it, “our truth is the intersection of independent lies” (1966,
423). Steven Orzack and Elliott Sober (1993) responded with an
equally forceful critique of this method, concluding that the idea
of robustness “lacks proper definition and that its bearing on the
question of whether a proposition is true is highly problematic”
(533). Replies to Orzack and Sober, from Levins (1993) and
Weisberg (2006b), have rejected the idea that RA, on its own,
can confirm the results of models. I argue that these replies have
not properly addressed Orzack and Sober’s real criticisms, which
focus not on the role of empirical data in RA but on the problem of
ensuring that the models used in RA are independent. By drawing
on accounts of RA in experimental science, I argue that there is in
fact a fallible but viable form of RA that can both confirm the results
of models and incorporate empirical data. However, for reasons
other than those of Orzack and Sober, I conclude that RA may be
of limited use in model-based science, as the example of fishery
biology can show.
In the context of modelling, Robustness Analysis (RA) is a way of
assessing the result of a model by showing that different but related
models give the same result. But what does the robustness of a result
tell us about the result? Steven Orzack and Elliott Sober (1993), writing in
the context of population biology, criticise the view that RA can confirm the
results of a model; that is, the view that the robustness of a result serves
as evidence of its truth. Richard Levins (1993) and Michael Weisberg
(2006b) read Orzack and Sober’s discussion as an accusation that RA is
an illegitimate form of confirmation because it does not draw on empirical
data. In response to this critique, Levins and Weisberg develop a version
of RA that does not confirm robust results and does not draw on empirical
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data. I argue (in Part I) that this move towards internal RA is misleading,
since there is a plausible general description of RA that is consistent
with the method being external, that is, both empirical and confirmatory.
Moreover, Orzack and Sober’s criticisms are directed not at the absence
of empirical content in RA but at the difficulty of showing that a given set of
models are sufficiently independent to confirm a robust result. Replies to
Orzack and Sober have neglected external RA, and Orzack and Sober’s
concerns about independence have gone unchallenged.
To address these issues I describe (in Part II) coincidence RA, an
account of RA that has been widely discussed in experimental science but
rarely applied to model-based science. Coincidence RA, I hope to show,
is an empirical form of RA that offers a fallible but viable confirmatory
tool to model-based science. Moreover, it can overcome the problems
of independence that Orzack and Sober identify (Part III). However, it
is by no means clear that external RA can make a smooth transition
from experimental science to a model-based science, as the example of
fisheries biology suggests (Part IV).
I. RA IN MODEL-BUILDING: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL VERSIONS.
Levins (1966) advocated RA in an influential paper on model-building in
population biology (the study of how the members of populations interact
with each other, with other populations, and with their environments).
Levins begins by noting the variety and complexity of biological
phenomena and the reliance of population biologists on simplified models
of their target systems (such as predator-prey systems, fish populations,
and sets of alleles). Levins suggests that models can be partitioned
into their “essential” parts or “core assumptions,” and their “artificial
assumptions” or the “simplifications, distortions, and omissions that are
introduced to facilitate the analysis” (1966, 423; 1993, 554). The core
assumptions are “essential” in the sense that they are true or expected
to be true of the target system, and also in the sense that, for a certain
range of behaviours, the behaviour of the model depends more strongly
on the core assumptions that on the artificial assumptions.
Levins writes that “[t]here is always room for doubt as to whether [the]
result depends on the essentials of a model or on the details of the
simplifying assumptions” (423). Thus the aim of RA is to find out which
parts of a model are responsible for a given result: to locate the origin of
the result. This is achieved in the following way:
...we attempt to treat the same problem with several alternative
models each with different simplifications but with a common
biological assumption. Then, if these models, despite their
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different assumptions, lead to similar results we have what we
call a robust theorem which is relatively free of the details of the
model. Hence our truth is the intersection of independent lies.
(Levins 1966, 423)
This passage is controversial, but the basic idea is clear. To assess
a result of a model, the modeller varies the artificial assumptions of a
model, holding the core assumptions fixed. If the result is “robust” over
these changes in the model, it must depend on the core assumptions.
Levins seems to add, in the final sentence of the passage, that “truth” of
the robust result follows from its robustness. Later, in a reply to Orzack
and Sober, Levins clarifies this point, noting that RA does not itself confirm
the result, and nor does it require gathering empirical data. Empirical data
is used, in standard ways, to confirm the core assumptions of the model,
and the robust result is true only if the core assumptions are true. Levins
expects this two-step procedure to appease Orzack and Sober, who (in
Levins’ words) “are worried that the robustness strategy seems to propose
a way to truth independent of observation” (1993, 54).
Weisberg (2006b) gives more detail than Levins about RA and how it
fits in to the practices of modellers, but his account of RA is the same as
Levins’ account in two salient respects. Firstly, Weisberg takes seriously
Orzack and Sober’s scepticism about non-empirical confirmation: those
authors are not only “rightly sceptical” about non-empirical confirmation
but, on Weisberg’s reading, this scepticism is the main basis for their
scepticism about RA (2006b, 732-33). Secondly, Weisberg’s response to
this scepticism is to develop a version of RA that is neither empirical
nor confirmatory. Weisberg differs from Levins in his account of how
modellers use RA to show that certain assumptions of a model, and not
others, are responsible for a result of the model. But he repeats Levins’
distinction between the use of RA to identify the responsible assumptions,
and the use of other methods to confirm those assumptions. Weisberg
summarises these two moves in the following passage:
Regarding robustness analysis as a non-empirical form
of confirmation [as Orzack and Sober do] is also an
oversimplification, one that distorts the origin of the
confirmatory weight attached to robust theorems. We are
now in a position to see why: Robustness analysis helps to
identify robust theorems, but it does not confirm them.1 (2006b,
742)
1This summary of Weisberg may not do full justice to his views as they are expressed
in Weisberg (2006b). He writes, for example: “If a sufficiently heterogeneous set of models
for a phenomenon all have the common structure, then it is very likely that the real-world
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Although these two moves help both authors to develop interesting
versions of internal RA, they lead away from some interesting terrain. In
particular, they deny the possibility of external RA: a version of RA that is
both confirms robust results and draws on empirical data. And they distract
attention (including critical attention) from the real grounds for Orzack and
Sober’s scepticism about RA.
The rejection of external RA would be warranted if external RA
were incoherent, in the sense that the basic idea behind the method is
inconsistent with RA being both empirical and confirmatory. Orzack and
Sober are silent on this question. But Weisberg offers a reconstruction of
Orzack and Sober’s reasoning that may be taken as an attempt to show
that external RA is incoherent. The reconstruction is based on the following
description of RA:
Robustness analysis consists in analysing a set of models
M1,..., Mn, and showing that, for every i , Mi → R . (Weisberg
2006b, 732)
Weisberg suggests that this procedure is “non-empirical” (732). This
conclusion follows trivially if “analysing a set of models” is taken to mean
“only considering models themselves.” Now, it may be reasonable to define
RA so as to exclude external RA by definition. Perhaps such a definition
would simply reflect a consensus among modellers that RA is not worth
doing if it involves gathering empirical data. But this would be to ignore a
plausible description of RA according to which external RA is not ruled out
by fiat. Consider the following schema:
Robustness analysis is an attempt to locate the origin of R by
showing, for some set of models M1,..., Mn, that Mi → R for
every i .
By “locating the origin of R” I mean identifying some property, entity,
relation, concept or structure that is responsible for R , whether causally
responsible, conceptually responsible, or some combination of the two.
This schema is a plausible extension of RA as described by Weisberg
and Levins, both of whom describe how modellers use RA to locate the
origin of a result. However this schema does not exclude the possibility
that RA can, so to speak, “reach into the world,” since it leaves open
the questions of whether the origin of R is located in the model or the
phenomenon has the corresponding causal structure” (739). Here Weisberg seems to
describe a version of RA that has confirmatory power. However the suggestion is not
developed further. Weisberg (2006a) is consistent with the reading I give in the body of
this paper.
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world, and whether it is responsible for RA in a causal or a conceptual
sense or a combination of the two. Granted, the schema does not mention
any data-gathering steps as part of RA. And one might argue that, once
each Mi is sufficiently well-defined, showing that Mi → R , for each i ,
can be completed as a purely conceptual (perhaps purely mathematical)
exercise. Nevertheless, there is plenty of room for empirical data to enter
into the schema: in showing that the models are sufficiently independent,
for example, and in lending empirical support to the models. The schema
is a plausible description of RA and it does not support a blanket rejection
of external RA.
The challenge to advocates of external RA is to fill out the schema by
describing how RA uses empirical data and how it confirms robust results.
It may be that in fact there do not exist any workable ways of filling out
the schema in this way. The best way to find out whether they exist or not,
however, is to examine the candidate accounts of RA and check whether
they can perform both tasks. As the accounts of Weisberg and Levins
illustrate, simply showing that RA be accompanied by empirical data or by
confirmation is not enough to show that these RA itself is using the data or
is confirming the result. A real defence of external RA needs to show that
confirmation and the use of empirical data are intrinsic to the procedure;
that is, intrinsic to an attempt to “locate the origin of R by showing that R
is robust.” In Part II of this paper I consider a version of RA that is usually
considered to be an example of external RA, and describe how empirical
data enters into the procedure and how it confirms robust results.
As noted above, Orzack and Sober do not claim that external RA
is incoherent.2 True, they do not endorse any versions of RA that
are empirical and confirmatory. But their grounds for doubt are not an
in-principle rejection of external RA but a belief that there is a specific
check on the confirmatory power of RA: the difficulty of defining the
property of independence for models, and the difficulty of finding sets
of reliable models that are independent. Insofar as they endorse any
instances of RA being applied to models in population biology, they do so
because the models used in those instances are more clearly independent
than the models used in the instances they do not endorse, not because
they are more clearly empirical.3 Hence the aim of Part IV is to tackle
Orzack and Sober head-on by defending RA against the problems of
2Indeed, Orzack and Sober have very little to say about non-empirical confirmation,
aside from noting (1993, 538) that Levins’ first version of RA seems to instantiate it.
3“Robust theorems,” Orzack and Sober write, “would be desirable if we could get
them. Perhaps, for example, a fair meiosis explanation (Leigh 1986) and Fisher’s (1930)
explanation for a 1:1 sex ratio are “independent” enough that they can be said to provide
a robust truth [i.e. a truth that is confirmed by virtue of its robustness]” (540).
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independence that they cite. This moves the discussion away from internal
RA, but towards a more complete assessment of Orzack and Sober’s
criticisms of external RA.4
II. EXTERNAL RA IN EXPERIMENTAL SCIENCE.
A promising place to look for an account of external RA is the
philosophy of experimental science, where a number of authors have
discussed the nature and merits of different forms of RA.5 Judging by
published work on RA, the possibility of such borrowing has not often been
seriously considered. Wimsatt (1981) places Levins’ account of RA in the
context of a much broader discussion about the role of RA in distinguishing
“that which is regarded as ontologically and epistemologically trustworthy
and valuable from that which is unreliable, ungeneralizable, worthless, and
fleeting” in scientific practice (128). But his account of how RA works for
models is not the same as the account of RA usually advanced by authors
in the context of experimental science, and he does not explicitly discuss
RA in the context of experiment. Wimsatt is a shared reference for authors
writing on RA in both models and experiment, but otherwise there seems
to be little exchange of ideas between the two strands of literature.
In this Part I describe a form of RA, which I call coincidence RA, that
philosophers have frequently applied to experimental science. I consider
whether or not this is an external form of RA, and consider an immediate
objection that might arise to the application of coincidence RA to models.
I argue that coincidence RA offers a fallible but viable form of external
RA to modellers, setting the scene for an assessment (in Part III) of
how coincidence RA can address Orzack and Sober’s worries about
independence.
Various authors have gone into various levels of detail about
coincidence RA and its variants.6 It will be useful to give a brief sketch
of the argument for coincidence RA, for which there are four steps.
The first step is to show that multiple techniques give rise to the same
result about a target object. The “techniques” may be instruments alone,
or a combination of data from instruments and theories about how the
instrument works.7 The second step is to infer from the convergence in
4It is worth noting that Orzack and Sober seem to agree with Weisberg and Levins,
more or less, on the value of internal RA. They describe a version of internal RA and
note that it “allows one to distinguish between assumptions [of a model] that are strong
determinants of a prediction [of the model] and those that are weak ones” (1993, 540).
5Philosophers of experimental science who endorse RA include Salmon (1978; 1984),
Urbach (1981), Cartwright (1983), Hacking (1983), Franklin (1984; 1986; 1990), Culp
(1999) and Weber (2005).
6Notably Salmon (1979; 1984), Culp (1995), Staley (2004), and Weber (2005).
7I use “instrument” in an expansive sense here to refer to the concrete parts
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the results of the techniques that the results must have a common origin;
that is, there must be some conceptual or concrete feature shared by the
techniques that is responsible for this convergence. This step has been
supported by an inference to the best explanation (for example, in Weber
[2006, 283]) and by probabilistic arguments (for example, in Salmon [1984]
and Culp [1995]). The third step is to observe that the common origin could
lie either in a feature of the two techniques themselves, or in the target
object that the techniques are designed to study. Now, if the techniques do
not share any common features, the latter option is the only one available;
that is, an object, property, or relation in the world is responsible for the
common result. The property of “not sharing any common features,” which
the techniques are required to have, is usually called independence. The
fourth step of coincidence RA is to infer that, since the target object is
responsible for the common result, the result must be true of that target
object.
One could imagine a fifth step in which it is inferred that the techniques
used in the procedure must be reliable. After all, if the result is true, each
technique has given a true result. This step is on sure ground, since
showing that a technique reproduces a “test result”–a result that is known
in advance to be true–is a widely accepted method of showing that the
technique is more generally reliable.8 Usually the truth of the test result is
established by some other technique that is already known to be reliable,
such as when a telescope is assessed by using it to view objects whose
details we can observe with the naked eye. Whether or not coincidence
RA is the origin of our confidence in the test result does not make any
difference to attempts to assess techniques by the “test result” method;
all that matters, as far as this method is concerned, is the degree of
confidence in the test result.
Although this fifth step is warranted, it is not intrinsic to coincidence RA,
precisely because it “does not make a difference” whether the truth of the
test result is established by coincidence RA or by some other technique.
Any other test result will do. So coincidence RA only has a special role to
play in assessing techniques if there are few or no test results available by
other means. If test results are available without the use of coincidence RA,
then those test results (and not RA) can be used to assess the techniques
that are in doubt. Of course, a single test result can be used to assess
of the technique that causally link the target object to observed data–even if those
causal processes are not packaged in the form of stable, self-contained devices like
microscopes. A container of smoke particles in Brownian motion is part of the “instrument”
used to find Avogadro’s number, for example.
8For example, Franklin (1986; 1990) gives various examples of this method being
applied to experimental physics.
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multiple techniques. This scenario mimics RA, but it is just a case of an
ordinary method being applied multiple times.
Anyone who is sceptical about external RA will want to know how
coincidence RA makes use of empirical data. It does so in a number
of ways. The first is to help develop the techniques such that they are
plausible; that is, they have a decent chance of giving consistently true
results about a phenomenon. The plausibility of the techniques has a
pragmatic and a logical role. Pragmatically, there are a large number of
instruments and assumptions that would, to a pre-scientific mind, seem
equally promising as techniques for a given target object. Only a small
number of these will be actually reliable, and it would be inefficient
to perform RA on these techniques in a trial-and-error manner until a
robust result appeared. Logically, we would be justifiably suspicious if this
trial-and-error procedure regularly gave robust results. The unlikelihood of
a robust result arising by chance from two independent techniques needs
to be weighed against the unlikelihood of two reliable techniques, each
relevant to the same target object, being developed by chance.
Another role for empirical data in coincidence RA is in making
judgments about whether the techniques used in the method are
independent. There are two extreme views about independence
judgments that any convincing defence of coincidence RA needs to
debunk: one view is overly optimistic and the other is overly pessimistic.
The optimistic view raises doubts about non-empirical confirmation. It is
the view that independence judgments about techniques used in RA can
be made just by analysing the logical relations between the theories about
the different techniques, without considering whether or not those theories
are true.9 Independence judgments are not the only point of entry for
empirical data into RA (see the previous paragraph), but they are arguably
the main point of entry. RA that denies this point of entry looks like it needs
very little empirical input to do its confirmatory work; in other words, it looks
too good to be true.
One reason the optimistic view might have intuitive appeal is that, if
two independent theories about two techniques give the same result, the
common origin of this result must lie outside the theories; it must lie in
the real world. But the real world includes not just the target object but the
instruments used to generate data about the object. So the common origin
may lie in the instruments and not the target object. Unless one knows that
9Culp (1995, 450-54) seems to take this view, using a logical notion of independence
(two theories are independent if “the truth and falsity of one is isolated from the truth and
falsity of the other”). This suggests that, according to Culp, techniques can be shown
to be independent just by analysing the theories used in those techniques, ie. without
confirming those theories.
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the instruments do not have any concrete features in common, one cannot
rule out the possibility that the common origin of the robust result lies in the
instruments. Hence the optimistic view about independence judgments is
overly optimistic, and does not raise worries about coincidence RA being
a non-empirical form of confirmation.
Coincidence RA clearly makes use of empirical data to establish the
plausibility and independence of the techniques used in the method.
But is it really the robustness of the result that confirms robust
results, according to coincidence RA? The overly pessimistic view of
independence judgments, if true, would cast doubt on the confirmatory
weight of robustness. The pessimistic view is that a pre-requisite for
making correct independence judgments about a set of techniques is
to have a well-confirmed theory about the instrument used in each
technique.10 This raises the suspicion that most or all of the confirmatory
power of coincidence RA comes from this prior knowledge of the reliability
of the techniques used.
However, it is not necessary to be confident that two techniques are
reliable in order to be confident that they are independent. Consider the
flagship case of coincidence RA, Jean Perrin’s multiple derivations of
Avogadro’s number.11 Avogadro’s number is the number of molecules in
one mole of a substance (the number of molecules in 2 grams of hydrogen
gas, for example). One of the techniques used to derive the number
involves observing the Brownian motion of smoke particles in a known
volume of gas, a technique that makes use of a formula for the kinetic
energy of massive particles (E = 1
2
mv 2) to deduce the mass of the particles
in the gas. Suppose, for arguments sake, that the energy formula was not
well-confirmed at the time of the derivation: perhaps some physicists had
reasons to believe that the coefficient and the power in the formula were
not 1
2
and 2 respectively, but 1
3
and 3. RA would still be effective in this
case, since it is not necessary to know the precise form of the energy
equation to know that the motion of the smoke particles, and our theory
about particulate motion, is independent of (for example) the electroplating
of silver, the basis for another of Perrin’s derivations. It is enough to know
that the energy formula deals with the motions of particles, and that the
amount of silver that is deposited in the plating process is not highly
sensitive to the precise way that particles move. Hence the pessimistic
view about independence judgments is mistaken, and it does not threaten
10Weber (2005, 286) takes this stance, saying that the “antecedently established
reliability of both techniques” in RA is required before one can be confident that a robust
result from those techniques is not an artefact.
11This example has been discussed by many authors. I draw on the accounts in Salmon
(1978; 1984) and Cartwright (1983). The original account is Perrin ([1913] 1923).
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the standing of coincidence RA as a procedure that can itself increase our
confidence in the truth of a robust result.
So far my account of coincidence RA has been guilty of idealisation
and abstraction, masking ongoing debates about the effectiveness of the
method. The second step of RA is to infer from a common result that a
common origin, responsible for the common result, must be present. This
description abstracts many details, and there is debate about how this step
should be filled in: for example, Salmon’s attempt to use a probabilistic
“principle of the common cause” is one variant under attack.12 Idealisation
enters my account in the assumption that sufficiently independent and
plausible techniques, giving sufficiently convergent results, will be available
for any given target object. There are good reasons to think that these
high-quality resources will be in short supply in scientific practice.13
Relatedly, it is possible to find numerous examples in experimental science
of failed applications of RA: cases where RA has led to a conclusion that
was either found later to be false, or was immediately trumped by a method
that could make better use of the resources available at the time.14
In RA’s defence, it is worth noting that rival and more traditional forms
of justification in science (induction, abduction, hypothesis-testing, and so
on) are also limited by the quality of the resources available in the context
of their use. Also, few (if any) writers on RA have denied that RA can
be a powerful form of empirical confirmation when high-quality resources
are available. None of the authors cited here have denied, for example,
that external RA plays a legitimate and powerful confirmatory role in the
case of Jean Perrin’s derivation of Avogadro’s number. The consensus
among philosophers of experimental science seems to be that external
RA is a fallible but viable method in experimental science, one that can be
used well sometimes but must be used with caution at all times. Insofar
as Orzack and Sober (and Levins and Weisberg) deny that external RA is
a viable method for modellers, the viability of the method in experimental
science is a fact in need of explanation. In Part III I consider the problems
with independence judgments that Orzack and Sober cite in their attack
on external RA, and argue that those problems do not supply the needed
explanation.
Before moving on, it is worth noting here one difference between
experiment and modelling that might seem to, but in fact does not, stand
in the way of a successful borrowing of external RA by modellers. In the
experimental case it is possible for the target object to be responsible,
12See Weber (2005, 281-83).
13See Stegenga (forthcoming, 5-6) for a summary of this kind of concern about RA.
14Wimsatt (1981), Rasmussen (1993), and Hudson (1999) give examples of these two
kinds of failure of RA.
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in a very direct way, for a common result. Consider two different
kinds of microscope, an optical microscope and an electron-transmission
microscope, focused on a bacterial sample. If the microscopes are working
correctly then the common result will be concrete: one can literally see
the similar images in the eye-piece of one and the screen of the other.
There may be differences between the two images (one will be greyscale
and the other not, for example). There may also be differences between
the common features of the images and the actual bacteria (in respect of
scale, for instance): differences such that the significance of the images
is not obvious without drawing on further assumptions about the working
of the instruments. But it remains true that the two microscopes yield
very similar results solely through the causal interactions between the
sample and the instruments. This is quite different from the modelling case,
where common results arise out of a conceptual system (such as a set of
mathematical equations) that has no direct causal link to the system it is
meant to describe.
This difference is relevant because some authors have suggested that
the first step of coincidence RA (the inference from a common result to a
common origin) is only permissible when the common origin is a causally
responsible for the common result. Cartwright (1983) maintains that
coincidence RA works only in cases where we “infer a concrete cause from
a concrete effect,” the reason being that in such cases “we assume that
causes make effects occur in just the way they do, via specific, concrete
causal processes” (84). Similarly, Salmon (1984, 223) maintains that, for
his variant of coincidence RA to work, ”there must be causal processes
leading from the causal background [the target system] to the correlated
effects [the common result].”15 If these restrictions on coincidence RA
hold, one might wonder whether the method is applicable in situations,
like model-building, where common results do not arise except through a
complex mixture of empirical and conceptual investigation.
It may be right to value causal RA over mixed RA. But mixed RA
must have some value–indeed, considerable value–because applications
of mixed RA are among the cases of RA that are widely regarded as
successful. Jean Perrin’s derivations of Avogadro’s number is one such
case. None of Perrin’s 13 derivations yield Avogadro’s number as a direct
causal product of an experiment. In each case, experimental data is
15Both Salmon and Cartwright may be read as placing much weaker restrictions on
the scope of coincidence RA than the restriction described above. Indeed, both are
well aware that (to quote Salmon) ”none of the methods used to ascertain the value
of Avogadro’s number does so exclusively on the basis of directly observable quantities
without any appeal to auxiliary hypotheses” (1984, 224, fn4). Nevertheless, both authors
could be read as casting doubt on mixed RA.
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coupled with theory about the causal processes behind the observations
to give a calculation of the number. Hence the mixed-ness of RA in the
models case should not on its own prevent modellers from making as much
use of RA as Perrin did.
III. INDEPENDENCE: A REPLY TO ORZACK AND SOBER.
Orzack and Sober maintain that the idea of robustness “lacks proper
definition and that its bearing on the question of whether a proposition is
true is highly problematic” (533). This scepticism about the confirmatory
power of RA derives largely from their concern about the notion of the
independence of models. They build their argument against external RA by
distinguishing three variants of the method. These variants differ in terms
of what is known about the models used. Modellers might know that at
least one of the models is true; know that all of the models are false; or not
know whether any of the models are true. The variant of RA I consider here
is closest to, but not identical to, the third of Orzack and Sober’s options.
As suggested in Part II, coincidence RA is defensible in the experimental
case when applied to a set of techniques, each of which is known to be
plausible. Replacing “techniques” with “models” in the previous sentence
gives the variant of RA that I shall now consider in light of Orzack and
Sober’s concerns about the notion of independence in RA.
The reason for making judgments about the independence of two or
more models is clear: to ensure that a result that is robust across those
models is not due to a false assumption held in common by the models.
Orzack and Sober think it is much less clear (firstly) what the property
of “independence” amounts to, and (secondly) how a set of models can
be independent and still give a robust result. I argue that the first of
these problems is real, but that it is negligible for our purposes because
it is no more a problem for RA applied to models than for RA applied
to experiments. The substance of the second problem is not entirely
clear, and the best answer to the problem is to present a procedure by
which modellers might develop independent models on which to perform
external RA. I will sketch an example from climate science to illustrate this
procedure.
Orzack and Sober consider two ways of defining the “independence”
of two models: statistical independence and logical independence. Their
concern about statistical independence is that “assigning probabilities to
models is not a coherent notion” (1993, 539). This may be a genuine
problem for external RA (and RA in general), but it does not explain why
coincidence RA should be any less viable in model-based science than
in experimental science: philosophers of experiment struggle to make
sense of the idea of assigning probabilities to experimental techniques.
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The existence of Bayesian accounts of RA in experimental science might
suggest otherwise. But even a well-developed Bayesian account, such as
that given by Allan Franklin, concedes that in practice it is very hard to
measure these probablities (1984, 51-2; 1986, 125). Indeed, the Bayesian
calculations in Franklin’s account are only used to establish the soundness,
in principle, of RA. When it comes to discussing particular cases of
independence, Franklin resorts to qualitative accounts. For example, to
establish that the bubble chamber and the spark chamber count as
“independent” ways of observing subatomic particles, Franklin gives a
loose statement of the theory about the two instruments: one works by
“bubble formation in superheated liquids” and the other by “electrical
discharge in ionized gases” (Franklin 1986, 125). The world of models
lacks a rigorous and practicable account of independence, but so does
the world of experiment.
Orzack and Sober’s second worry about independence is that, as a
matter of fact, the models that can be used in any given instance of RA
are unlikely to be independent: ”Generally speaking, competing models
are not independent” (1993, 539). Orzack and Sober do not say what
“competing models” are, or why they are typically dependent on each
other. A natural reading, which I will consider here, is that “competing
models” are “models of the same target system.” Examples of models that
compete in this sense are two models of predator-prey systems that differ
only in whether the account for the density dependence of the population
and the other does not; or models of evolution in a variable environment
that differ only in whether they take the environment to vary discretely or
continuously.16
Why might two models of the same target system be more likely to be
dependent than two models that are each of a different target system?
Intuitively, the facts about a target system constrain the number and range
of models that can accurately describe the system. So perhaps those facts
constrain the models so much that no two models of the same system can
be independent. A natural way to challenge this view is to emphasize the
freedoms that are available to model-builders when considering a target
system. Internal RA relies on one such freedom: some parts of a target
system can be strongly determinant of (if not all the behavior of a target
system) at least some range of the behavior of a target system. Hence
there are many models that are reliable with respect to that range of
behavior: all the models that represent the structure that dominates the
target system, but vary in respect of the non-dominant parts of the system.
This kind of freedom does not make room for external RA, of course,
because it still requires that each model of the system–if it is to reliably
16These examples are taken from Weisberg (2006b) and Levins (1966) respectively.
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describe the same behavior–must have in common a representation of
the dominant structure.
Levins suggests another degree of freedom that models (including
models of the same system) enjoy: “The difference between legitimate
and illegitimate simplifications depends not only on the reality to be
described but also on the state of the science,” where the “state of the
science” means the “problems” that the science addresses (1966, 422).
The difficulty with this defense is that “dealing with different problems” may
just mean “taking an interest in a different class of results.” For example,
Levins describes one “problem” in early population biology: “Could weak
natural selection account for evolutionary change?” (422). Plausibly, this
“problem” just picks out a particular class of results (evolutionary change)
of the target system (populations under weak natural selection). If this is
the case then this degree of freedom allows core assumptions to vary
across models of the same target system, but at the cost of robustness:
the class of trustworthy results varies as the core assumptions do.
Perhaps there are no other degrees of freedom that can support
the independence of competing models. Regardless, Orzack and
Sober’s concern about the non-independence of competing models is
unsatisfactory. For they do not say why RA must use only competing
models and not non-competing models. One might wonder whether
non-competing models will have too much freedom: surely they need to be
somewhat constrained in order to give convergent results; that is, results
about the same object, property, or structure. Coincidence RA suggests
an answer, inspired by experiment: the two models are of two different
target systems that are each causally linked to the same object, property,
or structure. It is worth illustrating this answer with a (very) schematic
example of how coincidence RA might be applied to models of climate
change.
The first task is to pick out a target object or property, a phenomenon to
record or detect. This phenomenon needs to be relevant to climate change.
It also needs to play a causal role in two independent causal chains that
lead from the target property to phenomena we can easily observe. The
target property might be the level of CO2 concentration in the atmosphere,
and the observable phenomena might be the frequency of acid rain events
and level of global temperatures. For each of these observables there is a
causal chain leading to it from the target property (CO2 concentrations).
The second step is to use background knowledge and data about
global climate to create a model, for each chain, that represents the causal
chain leading from the shared quantity to the observable quantity. These
models do not need to be well-confirmed, but they need to be plausible, as
discussed in Part II.
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Thirdly, use the models and the observed quantities to infer, for each
causal chain, the concentrations of CO2. The more we rely on our models
to make these inferences, the more effective RA will be.
Fourthly, check to see whether each model gives the same result about
concentrations of CO2. If they do, then we can be confident that the result
is true. We can also be confident that the models are reliable, insofar as
they were deployed in inferring the target property.
This procedure may not have precisely the same form as the procedure
followed by experimenters who want to measure an unobservable quantity
or test their theory about their techniques. For one thing, it is an example
of “mixed RA,” as defined above: it resembles Perrin’s derivations of
Avogadro’s number, not observations of the same target object made
through different microscopes. But the outcome of the procedure is the
same as in the experiment case: two techniques, based on two causal
processes, that support an inference from the divergent products of those
causal processes to their shared causal origin.
IV. FISHERY BIOLOGY: EXTERNAL RA IN PRACTICE.
Orzack and Sober’s doubts about the independence of models do not
stand up to scrutiny. But nor does external RA stand up to the scrutiny of
actual practice in model-based science. With a clear idea of how external
RA works in ideal conditions, we are in a position to see why the method
fails when conditions turn against it.
Consider the case of fishery biology. This is a good test case, since
fishery biologists tend to develop relatively realistic and precise models
of specific fish populations (Levins 1966, 422), the kind of models that
might support external RA. A glance at the methods of this field shows
that external RA is very rarely used, if at all. One might argue that external
RA is used on a small scale. To take one example, electrofishing and gillnet
fishing are techniques that can be used in tandem to give robust sets of
data about lake fish populations (as discussed in Eros et al., 2009). And
one might say that this small-scale RA involves models. But the models
are simple pictures of (for example) how fish interact with nets, not models
of the fish population and its large-scale dynamics. Models of the latter
kind contribute to assessments of open sea populations, where a variety
of models are used to predict future population changes and infer relevant
population variables (such as age structure) from the data (Cooper 2006).
But these models, if they are involved in RA at all, can only be involved
in internal RA. They are models about the same target system that are
generated by incorporating extra parameters into a basic model about how
the fish population evolves over time. Full-blown external RA is absent
here.
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Two considerations help to see why it is absent. One is that other, more
efficient methods are readily available to measure the relevant properties
of the system: the ecological equivalents of Avogadro’s number may be
slippery or widely dispersed, but they (or at least a sample of them) are
usually directly observable. It is not a straightforward exercise to measure
the size, mortality, or age structure of a population of ocean fish. But
it is considerably less demanding than the measurement exercise that
external RA would recommend. External RA might involve using a model
of the fish’s interaction with another species in the same area, along with
current data about that other fish species, to give one determination of the
target population’s size. Another model, describing the effect of the fish
population on a marine plant in the area, along with data about the plant
population, could provide a second determination of the fish population’s
size. This method may, in the end, give a measure of the size of the fish
population. But this would come at the cost of constructing two models and
collecting two data sets. By contrast, direct measurement of the population
size would involve collecting one data set.
A second consideration is that the target systems of fisheries biology
may not have the right qualities to support RA. Coincidence RA relies
on the presence of a specific causal structure in the target system: two
causal processes that are independent except for their shared causal
origin. As Levins reminds us, the need for models in population biology
is largely due to the complexity of its subject matter. If “complexity” implies
“interdependence,” it may in general be difficult, in highly complex systems,
to find causal processes with the right structure. Consider the method
(described in the previous paragraph) of measuring the population size
of fish A through fish A’s causal interaction with fish population B and
marine plant C. It may well be that population B is causally linked to plant
C, ruling out the possibility of constructing independent models of the two
causal interactions. Not having the experimenter’s luxury of isolating and
manipulating the target system (fish populations are considerable less
portable than collections of molecules) the modeller using external RA
must hope that nature puts the target property (the size of the fish A
population) in causal contact with other systems that he understands well
and that are independent of one another. Fishery biology suggests that
this hope is not often realised.
V. CONCLUSIONS.
The emphasis by Levins and Weisberg on internal RA lacks motivation,
since there is nothing incoherent about external RA. Indeed, consideration
of experimental science shows that there exists a fallible but viable form
of RA that both confirms robust results and makes use of empirical data.
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I have given an account of RA in experimental science, coincidence RA,
that shows where empirical data can enter into RA. I have also defended
coincidence RA against one objection that purports to show that the
empirical data deployed in coincidence RA is not intrinsic to the method.
This objection hinges on the notion of independence, the quality that two
or more techniques must have in order that a common result of those
techniques cannot be attributed to a common feature held between them.
Orzack and Sober’s attack on RA also hinges on the notion of
independence, and not (contra Weisberg) on the incoherence of external
RA. Yet Orzack and Sober’s chief concern about independence, that
“generally speaking, competing models are not independent,” ignores the
fact that models used in RA do not need to be competing models; that
is, they do not need to be models of the same target system. All that is
required is that the models are of target systems that are each causally
connected to the property or entity that the convergent result of the models
describes. The case of RA in experimental science helps to illustrate
this requirement, as does the hypothetical example, sketched above, of
coincidence RA used in the context of climate change.
The case of fishery biology shows that coincidence RA is not always an
appropriate method in model-based science; indeed, the fact that fishery
biology uses precise and realistic models of phenomena, and yet does
not use coincidence RA, suggests that the method is rarely suitable in
model-based science. One lesson from the fishery case is that there
may be a link between the reasons for using models in science (the
unfeasibility of experiment and the complexity of the phenomena) and
the reasons for the failure of RA in the fisheries case (RA is inefficient
as a measurement tool, and requires a specific causal structure in the
phenomena). A more general lesson is that the fortunes of external RA are
sensitive to the resources that are available in the context of its use: in the
fishery case, Orzack and Sober’s concerns about the non-independence
of models seem to hold true, though not quite in the way they describe
those concerns. In other fields or disciplines, these concerns may be
less relevant. Further investigation into model-based science should shed
further light on the conditions that favour external RA. But the first step to
evaluating external RA is to acknowledge that it is not incoherent. And the
second step is to find out how it performs in ideal conditions, a step that
experimental science can motivate and inform.
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